Introduction {#S1}
============

Despite its recent territorial loss, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) remains one of the deadliest, most active terrorist groups of our time ([@B32]). ISIS was catapulted to such notoriety with its effective online propaganda machine capable of flooding the web with slick, extremist digital content (e.g., beheadings, crucifixions, and mass executions), striking fear in the hearts of its enemies and galvanizing new recruits all over the world---up to 30,000 foreign fighters according to the [@B60]. The spread and reach of such communication apparatus have drawn over 60 jihadi movements in 30 countries to pledge allegiance to ISIS ([@B44]), becoming franchises of a global jihadi brand wreaking havoc in its wake. In the United States, there is a long history of homegrown networks inspired by radical Islam: since 9/11, of the 476 individuals arrested domestically for being connected to jihadist terrorism, the overwhelming majority (75%) has been United States citizens ([@B68]). Beyond flagging and taking down ISIS' online content, counterterrorism strategies have relied primarily on reducing the appeal of ISIS' ideology using counter-narratives, defined as an "intentional and direct communication strategy, within a political, policy, or military context, to discredit messaging of a violent extremist nature" ([@B22], p. 8). In a race to win the battle of "the hearts and the minds," a slew of social media campaigns attempt to critique ISIS's legitimacy on moral and religious grounds. Some are state-sponsored messages (e.g., United States State Department "Run---do not walk to ISIS land"); others include appeals from religious clerics or ISIS defectors as they are both perceived to be credible voices to challenge ISIS' narrative.

But how effective are counter-narratives to break the jihadi brand? Despite the widespread assumption among policy makers and practitioners that counter-narratives are successful in preventing violent extremism, scholars have noted the absence of empirical data to substantiate this claim ([@B22]; [@B53])---one of the most glaring gaps in the countering violent extremism literature. Here we provide the first ever experimental test of the effectiveness of counter-narratives to reduce support for ISIS in a sample of American Muslims. To be sure, there is nothing in the Quran that permits terrorism, and the conflation of Islam and terrorism is erroneous. Extremism knows no boundaries; people from any faith (e.g., Christianity, Judaism, etc.), or political affiliation (e.g., left or right wing) can radicalize and support violence to further their ideology. Although non-Muslims could also be influenced by ISIS' propaganda, the present study surveys American Muslims for the following reasons. First, ISIS' propaganda directly targets Muslims with the use of Islamic concepts to create a narrative whereby fighting against the West is a religious duty ([@B48]). For example, ISIS encourages Muslims to *hijra* (i.e., migrate for the sake of Allah) to their proclaimed *caliphate* (i.e., an Islamic state under the leadership of a caliph, a person considered the successor to the Prophet Muhammad), and conduct *jihad* (i.e., a struggle or fight against the enemies of Islam). Second, the United States being one of the main targets of Islamist terrorism ([@B13], [@B14]), ISIS propagandists are keen on recruiting American Muslims because they live in the United States and are, thus, more apt to perpetrate terrorist attacks on American soil ([@B35]). Third, verses of the Quran are often used in counter-narrative strategies to prevent extremism; knowing whether these verses are actually effective in steering American Muslims away from ISIS would be useful to policy makers and practitioners.

This evaluation is crucial on practical grounds because there has been no systematic effort to provide empirical, let alone experimental, evidence for the effectiveness of counter-narratives. This is a concern given the sizable resources that could potentially be wasted in a strategy with unclear benefits. Furthermore, on theoretical grounds, there are also compelling arguments against the use of counter-narratives. Combining two, hitherto separated, theoretical strands, namely psychological reactance theory and need for closure (NFC), we hypothesized that individuals at greater risk of radicalization (high *need for closure* individuals) who harbor rigid beliefs may display greater psychological reactance when exposed to communication attempts to change their worldview. Consequently, counter-narratives may produce the opposite of the desired effect and increase people's support for violent extremist groups.

Psychological Reactance {#S2}
=======================

The present work is grounded in psychological reactance theory ([@B6]), which posits that freedom is a fundamental motivation that generates strong negative reactions when it is threatened or eliminated. The psychological state following a threat to one's personal freedom is called *reactance*. Psychological reactance has been defined as an aversive state, involving hostile and aggressive feelings as well as negative cognitions ([@B67]; [@B66]; [@B59]; [@B16]; [@B45]; [@B17]; [@B51]). When experiencing reactance, individuals engage in various actions to relieve this feeling and reestablish their freedom. This is why persuasive messages often produce results at odds with their intent ([@B7]; [@B10]; [@B58]). For example, individuals are more likely to engage in behaviors that are forbidden and harbor more positive attitudes toward them than when they are not proscribed ("boomerang effect," [@B10]; [@B54]). Likewise, when exposed to counter-attitudinal information, individuals tend to derogate the source of the message or engage in counter-arguing ([@B31]; [@B6]; [@B69]). [@B50] have also shown that people are more likely to dismiss and resist a persuasive appeal if it targets an attitude toward which they are strongly committed.

In the realm of political attitudes, psychological reactance research has shown that, for both conservatives and liberals, exposure to ideologically dissonant information produces political polarization ([@B47]). In a sample of American students, [@B43] found that reactance due to political advertising is "associated directly with more negative cognitive responses, ad, and candidate evaluations and indirectly with lower intention to vote for the candidate supported by the ad" (p. 666). Results from a field experiment also conducted in the United States by [@B42] revealed that social pressure to increase voter turnout backfired and produced anger and hostility toward the message sponsor. Climate change skeptics have also been found to be more likely to display reactance (vs. a control group) when exposed to a message mentioning that there is scientific consensus regarding this topic ([@B41]). Likewise, research by [@B70] has shown that persuasive appeals in favor of ethical consumption resulted in reactance as evinced by negative appraisal of the source and negative attitudes toward the position advocated.

Extending the foregoing notions to violent extremism, one important question is who may be more likely to display psychological reactance when exposed to a counter-narrative against ISIS? The answer might be individuals with high NFC---people characterized by a desire for firm and unambiguous worldviews ([@B34]), who have been shown to be at greater risk of adhering to radical narratives ([@B64]). Exposing them to information that contradicts their firmly entrenched beliefs may be counterproductive by invigorating their ideological convictions. We now turn to this concept.

Need for Cognitive Closure {#S3}
==========================

The NFC is defined as a "desire for a firm answer to a question, any firm answer as compared to confusion, and/or ambiguity" ([@B34], p. 6). It's an epistemic motivation that influences how people process information and make judgments. Individuals with high NFC are driven by obtaining and maintaining closure, meaning that they tend to rapidly "seize" on information permitting a judgment on a given topic and "freeze" on such judgment, thus becoming closed-minded and relatively impervious to new relevant information ([@B38]). Furthermore, NFC is associated with a preference for worldviews that "assume the absolute nature of values and the existence of definite truths" ([@B26], p. 587) because they are stable and predictable belief systems that reduce the probability of having to deal with ambiguity. In contrast, individuals with low NFC eschew binding and definite views.

Empirical research has shown that NFC influences a range of intrapersonal, interpersonal, and group phenomena (see [@B34], for a review) associated with creating consensus and developing a sense of shared reality with other group members ([@B36]). For example, NFC is associated with exerting and experiencing uniformity pressures ([@B15]), agreeing with other group members ([@B39]), and rejecting group members who express opinions at odds with the group consensus ([@B37]). In the same vein, evidence suggests that NFC is associated with preserving group norms across varying generations of membership ([@B40]) and preferring unequivocal directives (i.e., harsh power tactics) from leaders ([@B3], [@B4]).

Radical narratives, such as the one promulgated by ISIS, are attractive to those high in NFC because they depict simplistic, "black-and-white," Manichean perspectives, whereby good and evil are perpetually locked into an antagonistic struggle, and aggression against the out-group is justified. Furthermore, radical groups are particularly effective in reducing uncertainty given that they are highly structured, have clearly defined goals, and provide a clear sense of purpose and identity ([@B30]; [@B62]; [@B18]). Consistent with this proposition, [@B64] found correlational and experimental evidence showing that NFC is related to being unwilling to compromise on important ideological values and endorsing non-normative ideals associated with one's political party. In large samples of individuals imprisoned for their affiliation with different terrorist organizations (i.e., ISIS, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), the same authors found that NFC is associated with supporting suicide bombings and armed struggle to further one's ideology. In sum then, individuals with high NFC are at greater risk of radicalization and potentially more likely to display reactance when exposed to a persuasive message crafted to challenge their firmly entrenched beliefs, destabilizing their sense of certainty and closure. The following study sought to examine this proposition.

The Present Research {#S4}
====================

The purpose of this research was to test the effect of counter-narratives to reduce support for ISIS using a 3 × 3 factorial experimental design varying the source of the narrative (United States Government, ISIS defector, and Imam) and the content of the narrative (social, political, or religious narratives) while comparing these groups to a control message. Furthermore, we examine whether the effect of counter-narratives holds for their critical target audience: individuals with high NFC who are at greater risk of radicalization ([@B64]; [@B61]).

These sources and their content were chosen for theoretical and practical reasons. First, from a theoretical standpoint, research has found that ISIS' propaganda revolves around "four distinct, yet entangled narratives" ([@B49] p. 11): (1) social (establishing a better society), (2) political (bringing a new world order through a global caliphate), (3) religious (using the Quran to legitimize violence), and (4) moral (destroying the West, a symbol of moral decay). We reasoned that, if ISIS has had success recruiting with these themes, they might also be effective in preventing individuals from joining ISIS. In a counter-narrative context, there is always a moral component, an indication that one mode of being is morally reprehensible. For this reason, the social, political, and religious counter-narratives described in the methods section below end with the following moral assertion: "And this is why, violence by the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) is unacceptable." Second, from a practical standpoint, the counter-narratives in this study model existing counter-narratives used against ISIS (e.g., see [@B12]; [@B20]; and [@B28]). This was to ensure the content validity of our messages.

Materials and Methods {#S5}
=====================

Participants and Procedure {#S5.SS1}
--------------------------

Expecting medium effect sizes and setting power at 0.80, a sample size of 77 participants per experimental condition was suggested using GPower ([@B21]). Eight hundred eighty-six American Muslims were recruited using Qualtrics^®^ panel service (444 women, 442 men; *M*~age~ = 39.42 years, and SD~age~ = 9.31 years; ethnicity: 68.5% white Caucasians, 1.9% Latinos, 14.1% Black/Africans, 8.7% Asians, 5.4% Arabs, and 1.4% Other; education: 6% high school, 9.1% some college/vocational, 21.6% completed college/vocational, 13.9% some postgraduate studies, and 49.4% completed postgraduate degree; and political preferences: 2.4% far left, 30.4% liberal, 29.9% moderates, 30.3% conservatives, and 7% far right). See [Table 1](#T1){ref-type="table"} for demographics.

###### 

Demographic profile distribution (*N* = 886).

                          **Demographic value**                 **Frequency**   **%**
  ----------------------- ------------------------------------- --------------- -------
  Gender                  Male                                  442             49.9
                          Female                                444             50.1
  Age                     18--24                                78              8.8
                          25--34                                127             14.3
                          35--49                                568             64.1
                          50--64                                107             12.1
                          65+                                   6               0.7
  Ethnicity               Arab                                  48              5.4
                          Asian                                 77              8.7
                          Black                                 125             14.1
                          Caucasian                             607             68.5
                          Hispanic                              17              1.9
                          Other                                 12              1.4
  Education               Completed high school                 53              6.0
                          Some college/vocational school        81              9.1
                          Completed college/vocational school   191             21.6
                          Some postgraduate                     123             13.9
                          Completed postgraduate                438             49.4
  Political preferences   Far-left                              21              2.4
                          Liberal                               269             30.4
                          Moderate                              264             29.9
                          Conservative                          268             30.3
                          Far-right                             62              7.0

Participants were invited to complete a short survey on political activism. After obtaining their written consent^[1](#footnote1){ref-type="fn"}^, the importance of religion and participants' need for cognitive closure was measured, after which they were randomly assigned to one of 10 experimental conditions. Before being exposed to the counter-message, participants were told that "in recent years, the social and political situation in Iraq and Syria has been extremely volatile and unsettling," that "some people have shared what they think and feel about this conflict," and that they would read a short paragraph about their opinion and then answer some questions. The dependent variable---support for ISIS---was measured after exposure to the counter-narrative. This online procedure is in line with terrorist organizations that have been using online platforms effectively to recruit, radicalize, and glamorize the use of violence to further their political agendas ([@B63]; [@B1]). Whether it is through e-magazines, social media, or online forums, virtually all terrorist organizations have moved their communication efforts to cyberspace ([@B65]), and narratives promoting political violence are readily accessible to anyone in a matter of clicks.

Counter-Narratives {#S5.SS2}
------------------

Each counter-narrative was first introduced by the following paragraph:

"In recent years, the social and political situation in Iraq and Syria has been extremely volatile and unsettling. Some people have shared what they think and feel about this conflict. In the following section, you will read a short paragraph about their opinion."

### Manipulating the Source {#S5.SS2.SSS1}

The source of the counter-narrative was specified after the introductory paragraph in the following ways: "an Islamic State defector has said" (in the defector condition), "an Imam has said" (in the Imam condition), and "the United States Government has said" (in the United States Government condition).

### Manipulating the Content {#S5.SS2.SSS2}

After mentioning the source of the counter-narrative, the content was manipulated with the following messages inspired by real counter-narrative campaigns.^[2](#footnote2){ref-type="fn"}^

#### Social counter-narrative {#S5.SS2.SSS2.Px1}

"We have seen it time and again, Islamist groups fighting in Iraq and Syria have committed unspeakable acts of cruelty against innocent people. They destroyed basic infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, sewage treatment plants, power generation, roads, and telecommunication, leaving people scrounging for food and water, and in desperate need of shelter and warm clothing. These ruthless groups have also plundered public resources, prevented old people from going to hospitals, and killed innocent women and children. Innocent civilians have greatly suffered and died because of their reckless actions. And this is why violence by the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) is unacceptable."

#### Political counter-narrative {#S5.SS2.SSS2.Px2}

"We have seen it time and again, Islamist groups fighting in Iraq and Syria are arrogant opportunists driven by power and only wish to further their own selfish interests. They exaggerate, twist, and turn facts to convince people to fight for them. They can be very charming and persuasive, but they lie, cheat, and fool people into thinking they should obey them and give them money. If that doesn't work, they'll take advantage of your weaknesses: loneliness, insecurity, or simple ignorance, to achieve their political and financial goals. And this is why violence by the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) is unacceptable."

#### Religious counter-narrative {#S5.SS2.SSS2.Px3}

"In the Quran, there is a Surah, "Surah 5, Al-Maida, Ayah 32" that says something important, it says: "*That is why We ordained for the Children of Israel that whoever takes a life---unless as a punishment for murder or mischief in the land---it will be as if they killed all of humanity; and whoever saves a life, it will be as if they saved all of humanity. Although Our messengers already came to them with clear proofs, many of them still transgressed afterwards through the land*." And this is why violence by the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) is unacceptable."

### Control Condition {#S5.SS2.SSS3}

Participants who were randomly assigned to the control condition were exposed to the following political blurb to ensure that participants across all conditions were exposed to content related to politics, which were also of equal length.

"For thousands of years, the study of political systems has been understood as inseparable from the study of social life as a whole. In the following section, you will read a short paragraph about the study of political systems. After reading it carefully, you will complete a short questionnaire.

A political system is a framework which defines acceptable political methods within a given society. The history of political thought can be traced back to early antiquity, with seminal works such as Plato's Republic, Aristotle's Politics and the works of Confucius. A variety of methods are deployed in politics, which include promoting one's own political views among people, negotiation with other political subjects, making laws, and exercising force, including warfare against adversaries. Politics is exercised on a wide range of social levels, from clans and tribes of traditional societies, through modern local governments, companies and institutions up to sovereign states, to the international level."

Measures {#S5.SS3}
--------

### Need for Cognitive Closure {#S5.SS3.SSS1}

Participants' need for cognitive closure (*M* = 5.11, SD = 1.23) was measured using two items taken from [@B52] short scale (i.e., "I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life" and "I dislike unpredictable situations"). The items were correlated (*r*~s~ = 0.41, *p* \< 0.001) and were, thus, averaged. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they agreed to each item on a seven-point scale ranging from one (*Not agree at all*) to seven (*Very strongly agree*).

### Importance of Religion {#S5.SS3.SSS2}

The extent to which participants consider religion important (*M* = 5.66, SD = 1.34) was measured with a single item ("Practicing my religious or spiritual beliefs is important for me") on a seven-point scale ranging from one (*Not agree at all*) to seven (*Very strongly agree*).

### Support for ISIS {#S5.SS3.SSS3}

Participants' support for ISIS (*M* = 3.03, SD = 1.55) was measured using five items (α = 0.91) that were averaged. These items were adapted from previous work on violent extremism ([@B56], [@B57]). Sample items include "I have a favorable opinion toward the Islamic State (i.e., ISIS)," "I like what the Islamic State (i.e., ISIS) is doing," and "I would consider joining this group." Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they agreed to each item on a seven-point scale ranging from one (*Not agree at all*) to seven (*Very strongly agree*).

### Data Availability {#S5.SS3.SSS4}

The questions of our survey are included in the [Appendix](#A1){ref-type="app"}. Furthermore, the data supporting the findings of this study have been deposited in the Open Science Foundation repository: <https://osf.io/jsxk6/?view_only=a300e008a90a403c90c14be4d686d211>.

Results {#S6}
=======

Counter-Narrative Main Effects {#S6.SS1}
------------------------------

We display support for ISIS across all experimental conditions in [Figure 1](#F1){ref-type="fig"}. [Table 2](#T2){ref-type="table"} presents four regression models predicting support for ISIS, testing several features of counter-narratives, and adjusting for sociodemographic variables (age, gender, education, political preferences, importance of religion, and ethnicity). The dependent variable, support for ISIS, was not normally distributed; therefore, all analyses were conducted with the bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrap method (5,000 resamples per analysis) to produce accurate estimations of standard errors and 95% confidence intervals ([@B23]; [@B19]; [@B11]).

![Support for ISIS across experimental conditions (*N* = 886). *\*p* \< *0.05.*](fpsyg-11-01059-g001){#F1}

###### 

Standardized regression coefficients predicting support for ISIS (*N* = 886).

  **Regression models predicting support for ISIS**   **(1)**        **(2)**       **(3)**        **(4)**
  --------------------------------------------------- -------------- ------------- -------------- --------------
  Age                                                 0.084          0.075         0.084          0.087
  Gender (1 = Male; 2 = Female)                       −0.148\*\*\*   −0.128\*\*    −0.146\*\*\*   −0.147\*\*\*
  Education                                           0.220\*\*\*    0.211\*\*\*   0.220\*\*\*    0.221\*\*\*
  Left-right political views                          0.296\*\*\*    0.300\*\*\*   0.295\*\*\*    0.296\*\*\*
  Importance of Religion                              0.001          --0.020       0.001          --0.001
  Ethnicity: White                                    0.121          0.120         0.121          0.121
  Ethnicity: Black                                    0.133          0.138         0.135          0.134
  Ethnicity: Arab                                     --0.048        --0.052       --0.047        --0.048
  Ethnicity: Asian                                    --0.106        --0.107       --0.105        --0.098
  Main effect                                         −0.107\*\*     −0.112\*\*                   
  NFC                                                                0.092\*                      
  Main effect\*NFC                                                   0.154\*\*\*                  
  Source: United States Government                                                 --0.313        
  Source: Imam                                                                     −0.370\*       
  Source: ISIS defector                                                            −0.426\*\*     
  Content: Social                                                                                 −0.369\*
  Content: Political                                                                              −0.520\*\*\*
  Content: Religious                                                                              --0.223
                                                                                                  
  Adj *R*^2^                                          0.10           0.11          0.10           0.11
  F                                                   11.53          10.70         9.66           10.01

Note: \*p

\<

0.1; \*\*p

\<

0.05;

and

\*\*\*p

\<

0.01

.

Model 1 tests the main overall effect of counter-narratives by comparison to the control group. Taking all sources and narrative contents together, counter-narratives significantly reduce support for ISIS (β = −0.107, *p* = 0.043). A more detailed analysis of variance shows differences between the experimental conditions with only two counter-narratives significantly reducing support for ISIS compared to the control group: a political narrative delivered by an ISIS defector \[Tukey HSD mean~diff~ = −0.794, CI (0.33, 1.22)\] and a social narrative delivered by an Imam \[Tukey HSD mean~diff~ = −0.493 CI (0.03,0.94)\]. These two counter-narratives did not significantly differ from one another \[Tukey HSD mean~diff~ = −0.30 CI (−0.71,0.11)\]. By comparison to the most effective counter-narrative (i.e., political narrative from ISIS defector), a religious counter-narrative delivered by the government was the least effective \[Tukey HSD mean~diff~ = 0.730, CI (−1.13, −0.31)\].

The overall main effect was moderated by NFC (Model 2). The overall main effect of counter-narratives is strengthened (β = −0.112, *p* = 0.028) when accounting for the interaction with NFC, which produces a reactance effect (β = 0.154, *p* = 0.003; Model 2). There are no differences between the groups for baseline NFC (*F* = 0.981, *p* = 0.454), and the main effect of NFC is marginally positive in increasing support for ISIS (β = 0.092, *p* = 0.057).

Models 3 and 4 focus on the main effects per source and narrative content, respectively. Per source (Model 3), an ISIS defector was the most effective messenger (β = −0.426, *p* = 0.032), followed by an Imam (β = −0.37, *p* = 0.064), with the United States Government being a marginally beneficial source (β = −0.313, *p* = 0.078). Per content (Model 4), political narratives were the most effective (β = −0.520, *p* = 0.009), followed by social narratives (β = −0.369, *p* = 0.059), and no significant effect was produced by religious narratives (β = −0.223, *p* = 0.258).

Regardless of the experimental manipulation, there is, across all models, results indicated that men were more supportive of ISIS than women. Furthermore, political right-wing views and education were positively related to support for ISIS.

Testing Counter-Narratives for At-Risk Individuals {#S6.SS2}
--------------------------------------------------

Using multiple regression analyses, we then tested whether support for ISIS increases as a function of high (+1 SD) and low (−1 SD) NFC when individuals are exposed to counter-narratives. For each counter-narrative, we entered NFC, the experimental condition (coded 0 = control condition, 1 = counter-narrative), and its interaction term as predictors and controlled for importance of religion. Five of the nine interactions were significant and indicated a boomerang effect; they are described below and presented in [Figures 2](#F2){ref-type="fig"}, [3](#F3){ref-type="fig"}. The interaction terms that were not significant were the social counter-narrative presented by the United States Government (*p* = 0.10; see [Figure 3A](#F3){ref-type="fig"}) and the political counter-narrative presented by the United States Government (*p* = 0.15), the ISIS defector (*p* = 0.25), and the Imam (*p* = 0.37).

![Support for ISIS as a function of Muslims' need for closure and exposure to a religious counter-narrative (vs. control message) delivered by **(A)** the United States Government, **(B)** an ISIS defector, and **(C)** an Imam. All interactions are significant. Low NFC = −1 SD; High NFC = + 1 SD.](fpsyg-11-01059-g002){#F2}

![Support for ISIS as a function of Muslims' need for closure and exposure to a social counter-narrative (vs. control message) delivered by **(A)** the United States Government, **(B)** an ISIS defector, and **(C)** an Imam. All interactions are significant, except **(A)** which, though in the expected direction, was not significant. Low NFC = −1 SD; High NFC = + 1 SD.](fpsyg-11-01059-g003){#F3}

### Government Religion {#S6.SS2.SSS1}

Need for closure (β = 0.03, *p* = 0.81) and counter-narrative (β = −0.02, *p* = 0.80) were not associated with support for ISIS, but the interaction was significant (β = 0.27, *p* = 0.02). As displayed in [Figure 2A](#F2){ref-type="fig"}, follow-up simple slope analyses suggest that NFC was positively associated with support for ISIS in the counter-narrative (β = 0.28, *p* = 0.06) but not in the control condition (β = −0.26, *p* = 0.21). The model explained 2% of the variance.

### Defector Religion {#S6.SS2.SSS2}

Need for closure (β = 0.07, *p* = 0.60) and counter-narrative (β = −0.13, *p* = 0.27) were not associated with support for ISIS, but the interaction was significant (β = 0.25, *p* = 0.04). As displayed in [Figure 2B](#F2){ref-type="fig"}, follow-up simple slope analyses suggest that NFC was positively associated with support for ISIS in the counter-narrative (β = 0.31, *p* = 0.05), but not in the control condition (β = −0.18, *p* = 0.37). The model explained 2% of the variance.

### Imam Religion {#S6.SS2.SSS3}

Need for closure (β = −0.007, *p* = 0.96) and counter-narrative (β = −0.13, *p* = 0.28) were not associated with support for ISIS, but the interaction was significant (β = 0.28, *p* = 0.02). As displayed in [Figure 2C](#F2){ref-type="fig"}, follow-up simple slope analyses suggest that NFC was positively but marginally associated with support for ISIS in the counter-narrative (β = 0.26, *p* = 0.13) but not in the control condition (β = −0.29, *p* = 0.17). The model explained 2% of the variance.

### Defector Social {#S6.SS2.SSS4}

Need for closure (β = 0.13, *p* = 0.28) and counter-narrative (β = −0.13, *p* = 0.28) were not associated with support for ISIS, but the interaction was significant (β = 0.39, *p* \< 0.01). As displayed in [Figure 3B](#F3){ref-type="fig"}, follow-up simple slope analyses suggest that NFC was positively associated with support for ISIS in the counter-narrative (β = 0.40, *p* = 0.001) but not in the control condition (β = −0.23, *p* = 0.15). The model explained 5% of the variance.

### Imam Social {#S6.SS2.SSS5}

Need for closure (β = 0.08, *p* = 0.55) was not related to support for ISIS. However, people exposed to the counter-narrative (*M* = 2.90, SD = 1.54) reported less support for ISIS than people exposed to the control message (*M* = 3.39, SD = 1.60; β = −0.26, and *p* = 0.03). Most importantly, the interaction was significant (β = 0.27, *p* = 0.02). As displayed in [Figure 3C](#F3){ref-type="fig"}, follow-up simple slope analyses suggest that NFC was positively associated with support for ISIS in the counter-narrative (β = 0.27, *p* = 0.04) but not in the control condition (β = −0.17, *p* = 0.29). The model explained 2% of the variance.

Discussion {#S7}
==========

Integrating psychological reactance theory and NFC, the purpose of this research was to answer two fundamental questions related to counter-narratives: (1) Can they reduce the appeal of ISIS among American Muslims, and (2) are they effective with at-risk individuals? Although counter-narratives have been part of virtually all counterterrorism strategies around the globe, the present research is the only study testing whether they are effective to mitigate support for a terrorist organization. Overall, our experimental results demonstrate that there is a small but positive effect of counter-narrative on reducing support and willingness to join ISIS. Independently of the content of the counter-narrative, the most effective source was an ISIS defector, followed by an Imam (although marginally); the government as a spokesperson did not produce a significant effect. Independent of the source, the most effective content was the political counter-narrative, followed by the social counter-narrative (although marginally); the religious counter-narrative did not mitigate support for ISIS. Across all experimental conditions, the most successful message was an ISIS defector delivering a political counter-narrative followed by an Imam delivering a social counter-narrative.

Despite these encouraging results, we also found strong support for the notion that counter-narratives often yield the opposite of the intended effect. Indeed, five out of nine counter-messages produced a boomerang effect when shown to their target audience, namely individuals at greater risk of radicalization with high NFC ([@B29]; [@B64]). Our results demonstrate that all counter-narratives with a religious argument backfired regardless of the source of the message. This is an important finding given the widespread assumption that a moderate, mainstream understanding of Islam, especially when articulated by an authoritative religious leader, attenuates the allure of violent extremism ([@B9]; [@B5]). Results did not support that proposition. Likewise, counter-narratives involving a social argument also backfired when delivered by an ISIS defector or an Imam. This shows that highlighting the devastating social effects of ISIS on the Muslim community (i.e., the ummah) does not produce its intended effects despite recommendations from many agencies to use this approach ([@B33]; [@B46]).

The present research, however, is not impervious to methodological limitations. One such limitation consists of the sample that included a large proportion of Caucasian individuals who had completed a postgraduate degree. Future research should attempt to replicate our findings in a different cultural context with a more ethnically diverse sample with a broader educational background. For instance, our findings could be replicated in countries that have produced large numbers of foreign fighters, such as France, Sweden, Belgium, and Norway.

Policy Implications {#S7.SS1}
-------------------

Taken together, the present research supports the notion that individuals with high NFC relinquish uncertainty and are, thus, resistant to change and unwilling to compromise on their political convictions ([@B64]). Attempts to shape their perspective have the unintended effect of strengthening their ideological positions. These findings, thus, challenge the widely held assumption that the appeal of violent extremism among vulnerable individuals will decrease if they are exposed to narratives intended to break the jihadi brand. Consequently, the fundamental practical implication of this work is that practitioners, NGOs, and governments should refrain from using counter-narrative strategies to counter violent extremism.

Furthermore, the fact that the social narrative delivered by an Imam generally produced positive results but backfired when shown to high-NFC individuals, suggests that policy makers and practitioners should choose their target audience carefully and disseminate their counter-narratives through narrowcasting (as opposed to broadcasting) or perhaps even one-to-one conversation to avoid exposing segments of the population susceptible or sympathetic to narratives of violent extremism. Interestingly, however, no backfire effect was observed for political counter-narratives, and this begs future research to examine why some counter-narratives provoke more reactance than others among higher risk individuals. One possible explanation is that revealing that ISIS exploits people for its own political agenda creates a state of disillusionment with the terrorist group and is, thus, more effective to neutralize the jihadi narrative. Future research should clarify these issues and examine the effect of counter-narratives across cultures to increase the generalizability of the present findings.

Theoretical Implications {#S7.SS2}
------------------------

The present research, borne out of the integration of psychological reactance theory and NFC, affords new insights for each line of work. One of the main contributions of this research is to show that psychological reactance is relevant to the study of terrorism---a critical point given that one of the primary objectives of this field of inquiry is to craft effective methods to convince individuals to abandon violent means in the pursuit of their political or religious goals (see [@B2]). This contribution is significant considering that scholars have observed that using counter-narratives to prevent violent extremism "is built on very shaky theoretical and empirical foundations" ([@B24], p. 1). And, indeed, the present research demonstrates that counter-narratives can be counterproductive by creating reactance and increasing the appeal of violent extremism among individuals who are at greater risk of radicalization. Although these results challenge the widespread assumption that counter-narratives are effective against violent extremism, they provide support for the tenets of psychological reactance theory and mirror the findings in public health research whereby health promotion messages are often shown to increase the behavior they are intended to mitigate (e.g., [@B55]; [@B27]; [@B58]).

The second theoretical contribution of this research is to demonstrate that the NFC is related to psychological reactance---a relationship that hasn't been documented in prior work. Indeed, by showing that the NFC creates a boomerang effect, we provide evidence that individuals with entrenched beliefs are more likely to resist persuasive appeals to a higher degree. This contribution is meaningful because psychological reactance theory predicts that the magnitude of reactance increases as a function of the importance of the freedom that is threatened, which is typically manipulated by increasing the importance of a behavior or an attitude or, in [@B8] terminology, "varying \[the\] magnitude of need" (1981, p. 41). Here, we show that one such need is NFC, and it reflects the degree to which people want to preserve their belief systems to avoid uncertainty. The greater such need, the greater the reactance to persuasive appeals. All in all, the present work contributes to psychological reactance theory by showing that NFC produces a counterforce motivating people to reassert their belief in an ideological system that affords them to maintain closure across time and contexts.

Conclusion {#S8}
==========

There is a consensus that eradicating violent extremism requires a long-term investment in structural, complex, multilayered interventions from education to social and economic development ([@B25]). Concomitantly, there is also the need to act in the short term with strategies that can assist in preventing or countering violent extremism in more immediate timespans. The threat from terrorist propaganda is real, and counter-narratives are the cornerstone short-term intervention in the fight against violent extremism. However, the urgency to deploy communication strategies to attenuate the appeal of ISIS should not be an excuse to avoid rigorous standards to produce evidence-based policies because the risk of backfiring and accelerating further radicalization is also real and threatens public safety. Until future research can further assess these effects, we suggest counter-narratives should be used by practitioners and policy makers' campaigns only after careful consideration.
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The social, political, and religious counter-narratives were inspired by the following sources, respectively: <https://www.military.com/video/operations-and-strategy/terrorism/welcome-to-the-islamic-state-land/3775821940001> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Lb7J6WDZpw> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ceaaS8-mj-k>

Each measure was answered on the following seven-point scale:

1.  Not agree at all

2.  Very slightly agree

3.  Slightly agree

4.  Moderately agree

5.  Mostly agree

6.  Strongly agree

7.  Very strongly agree

Need for Closure {#S12.SS1}
================

Read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree with each according to your beliefs and experiences.

1.  I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life

2.  I dislike unpredictable situations.

Importance of Religion {#S12.SS2}
======================

While thinking of Islam, please indicate your level of agreement with the item below.

1.  Practicing my religious or spiritual beliefs is important for me.

Support for ISIS {#S12.SS3}
================

The following questions pertain to the Islamic state (also known as ISIS). Read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree with each according to your beliefs and experiences.

1.  I like the Islamic State (i.e., ISIS) very much.

2.  I have a favorable opinion toward the Islamic State (i.e., ISIS).

3.  I like what the Islamic State (i.e., ISIS) is doing.

4.  I would consider joining this group.

5.  I think what the Islamic State (i.e., ISIS) is doing is morally reprehensible.
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